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First described in 1944 by Hans Asperger (1944), it was not before 1994 that Asperger
Syndrome (AS) was included in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, only to disappear in the Manual’s fifth edition in 2013. During its brief
existence as a diagnostic entity, AS aroused immense interest and controversy. Similar
to patients with autism, AS patients show deficits in social interaction, inappropriate
communication skills, and interest restriction, but also display a rich variety of subtle
clinical characteristics that for many distinguish AS from autism. However, difficulties
operationalising diagnostic criteria and differentiating AS from autism ultimately led to its
merging into the unifying category of Autistic Spectrum Disorders. Here we briefly review
the short history of this fascinating condition.
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INTRODUCTION: REFRIGERATOR MOTHERS AND
FINE-BONED ARISTOCRATS
The entry of autism and Asperger syndrome (AS) into the history of psychopathology was marked
by extraordinary coincidences. Both disorders were ﬁrst described by Kanner (1943) and Asperger
(1944), respectively. Both were Austrian-born physicians and, though unaware of each other’s
writings, both used the term “autistic” to describe a unique group of children who shared features
of impaired social interaction and restricted, repetitive behaviors and interests. Both Kanner
(1943) and Asperger (1944) borrowed the term “autistic” from Eugen Bleuler, who used it in
his “Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias” to describe extreme social withdrawal
and self-centeredness in patients with schizophrenia. Moreover, both authors emphasized that the
syndrome they were describing diﬀered from infantile (e.g., De Sancti’s dementia praecocissima)
and juvenile schizophrenia, namely by manifesting from birth and improving (in terms of
social interaction) with growth, in contrast to the usual course of schizophrenia (Higier, 1923).
Signiﬁcantly, although Kanner (1943) initially considered language abnormalities (varying from
sheer absence of language to atypical, socially ineﬀective use of well-developed language) to be
a deﬁning feature of his “Autistic Disturbances of Aﬀective Contact,” he later hypothesized that
they could be secondary to the two nuclear features of the disorder: “extreme self-isolation” and
“obsessive insistence on sameness” (Irwin et al., 2011). Furthermore, Kanner (1943) also noted
that many of his patients possessed “good cognitive potential.” Linguistic and cognitive ability
would later sit in the eye of the storm unleashed by the appearance of AS as a discrete diagnostic
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entity and the relentless polemic that accompanied it. While
Kanner’s syndrome eventually made its way to the third edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-III), Asperger’s work, published in German, remained
virtually unknown to the international scientiﬁc community for
almost half a century. Indeed, the ﬁrst English translation of
Asperger’s article “Die Autistischen Psychopathen im Kindesalter”
ﬁrst appeared in 1991 in Uta Frith’s textbook “autism and
AS.” AS had already been described in 1981 by Lorna Wing,
who ﬁrst proposed the term to refer to a special subgroup
of children who, according to Asperger’s original description,
were characterized by: social isolation and lack of reciprocity in
social interactions; normal or precocious language acquisition,
with above-average linguistic skills but subtle abnormalities of
verbal and non-verbal communication (e.g., atypical syntax,
pedantic vocabulary and absent or stereotyped prosody); a
narrow focus of interests, often restricted to unpragmatic and
highly original themes; overachievement in speciﬁc cognitive
domains; and motor clumsiness (Wing, 1981). Unlike Kanner
(1943), Asperger (1944) did not attempt to deﬁne diagnostic
criteria for the disorder he was describing. Moreover, Asperger
greatly emphasized subtle positive features in his patients:
they often had extremely original thought, they tended to
cultivate abstract and intellectualized interests, often had, in
Asperger’s own words, “a rare maturity of taste in art,” and
even a peculiar, fascinating physical appearance, with “ﬁnely
boned features,” of “almost aristocratic appearance” (Asperger,
1944). Asperger’s captivating descriptions of his subjects certainly
played a decisive role in the history of the syndrome that
bore his name, especially as they contrasted sharply with
Kanner’s later recriminatory writings on “refrigerator-mothers”
and the origin of autism (Irwin et al., 2011). Indeed,
although Lorna Wing in her initial account of Asperger’s
work clearly stated her belief that AS and Kanner’s autism
were both part of an autistic spectrum, the idea of AS as
an autonomous disorder, distinct from autism, quickly got
hold of the opinion of many authors in the ﬁeld, and
certainly of the general public’s curiosity for autism and
related disorders (Wing, 1994). It is important to note here
that Asperger himself referred to Kanner’s paper, concluding
that his subjects were clearly diﬀerent from those described
by Kanner (1943). The idea quickly made its way that
Kanner’s autism and AS were diﬀerent disorders, distinguished
mainly by the fact that AS children had good cognitive
and linguistic skills and a normal development in the ﬁrst
2–3 years of life (Klin, 2003). Moreover, for many authors the
impairment in social interaction diﬀered qualitatively between
AS and Kanner’s autism: while in the latter children seemed
completely uninterested in others, AS children tried to relate
with others but approached them in a dysfunctional and
inconvenient way (Gillberg, 2002; Klin, 2003). Asperger himself
contributed to this view that autism and AS subjects might
be distinguished on the basis of cognitive ability and language
development by emphasizing his patients’ high intelligence
and their acquisition of grammatical speech before they
could walk (Wing, 1994). The number of publications on
AS grew exponentially in the years following Wing’s (1981)
paper, and in 1994 AS was ﬁnally included in DSM – IV
(Figure 1).
DEFINING ASPERGER SYNDROME: A
TOWER OF BABEL
DSM-IV broadened the diagnostic boundaries of Autism,
conceived for the ﬁrst time as a spectrum of disorders that
included Autistic Disorder, AS and Pervasive Developmental
Disorder Not Otherwise Speciﬁed (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 1994). Also new was the inclusion of
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder (Heller Syndrome) and Rett
Syndrome, both characterized by developmental regression with
severe autistic features (Matson and Mahan, 2009). A diagnosis
of Autism required only six symptoms (in contrast with the
minimum of eight required in DSM-IIIR), including at least
two social interaction deﬁcits, two communication deﬁcits,
and one symptom of interest restriction/repetitive behavior.
Functional impairment had to be obvious before age three. The
newly created category of AS required at least two symptoms of
social interaction deﬁcits and one symptom of behavioral and
interest restriction, normal cognitive, and linguistic development
before age 3, and age-adequate adaptive functioning in areas
other than social interaction. Onset before age three was not
mandatory. Importantly, the subject should not meet diagnostic
criteria for Autistic Disorder – in which case the latter diagnosis
should be given precedence, implying a diﬀerential diagnosis
between AS and autism without cognitive delay, also called
high-functioning autism (HFA; Klin et al., 2005). Meanwhile,
other sets of diagnostic criteria for AS had appeared (Figure 2).
In 1988 Carina and Christopher Gillberg (2002) proposed
six criteria based on Asperger’s original case-reports: socially
impairing egocentricity, narrow interest patterns, compulsive
routine adherence, peculiarities of speech and language, deﬁcits
in non-verbal communication, and motor clumsiness (Gillberg,
2002). Diagnosis required all six. There was no clause precluding
a diagnosis of autism, and no mention of a minimum age limit or
periods of normal development. 1 year later, Szatmari et al. (1989)
proposed four mandatory criteria, comprising 22 symptoms:
social isolation, impaired social functioning, deﬁcits in non-
verbal communication, and peculiarities of speech and language.
As in DSM-IV, Autism was given diagnostic precedence over
AS. Finally, WHO’s 1993 International Classiﬁcation of Diseases
and Disorders (ICD-10) also suggested diagnostic criteria for
AS, essentially similar to DSM-IV’s (World Health Organization
[WHO], 1992). Although not exactly contradictory, these
several diagnostic schemes nevertheless produced a bewildering
semiologic cacophony. Gillberg’s criteria are too restrictive,
and the only mentioning clumsiness as a mandatory symptom.
Szatmari’s criteria do not include interest restriction – a major
criterion in the remaining diagnostic systems. DSM-IV and
ICD-10 do not require abnormal non-verbal communication,
mandatory in Gillberg’s and Szatmari’s sets. However, the most
problematic clause, present in ICD-10, DSM-IV and Szatmari’s
criteria, was the exclusion of a diagnosis of AS if criteria for
autism were met.
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FIGURE 1 | Results of a pubmed search for articles containing the word “Asperger” in the title, published between 1976 and November 2015.
THE END IN THE BEGINNING
The consecration of AS as a distinct diagnosis was surrounded
by controversy from the outset. Contradictions in the syndrome’s
deﬁnition soon became evident that would ultimately doom AS
to extinction in DSM-5. The main problem was the precedence
given to a diagnosis of autism. It soon became clear that
most patients with signiﬁcant impairments in social interaction
and restriction of interests and activities also fulﬁll criteria
for autistic disorder, thus precluding a diagnosis of AS. The
requirement of normal cognitive and linguistic development
failed to rescue a diagnosis of AS for the simple reason that
cognitive and linguistic delay are not mandatory for diagnosing
autistic disorder (Mayes et al., 2001; Happé, 2011). As Miller and
Ozonoﬀ (1997) demonstrated, even Asperger’s own initial cases
would fail to qualify for a DSM-IV diagnosis of AS. Moreover,
it is often diﬃcult to establish retrospectively if a patient had
normal language before the age of three, and full-scale IQ is
seldom a useful measure in AS, given the typically heterogeneous
IQ proﬁle (Gillberg, 2002; Spek et al., 2008). Consequences of
this conundrum soon became visible in research. Researchers
used AS and HFA as interchangeable diagnoses, modiﬁed DSM
or ICD criteria, or used original, investigator-speciﬁc criteria,
compromising comparability across studies (Klin et al., 2005).
Gradually, two positions regarding AS emerged in the ﬁeld: (1)
diagnosing AS using DSM-IV criteria is impossible because AS
does not exist and is indistinguishable from HFA; (2) DSM-
IV’s deﬁnition of AS is over-restrictive and additionally fails to
discriminate AS from HFA (Szatmari, 2000; Mayes et al., 2001;
Klin et al., 2005). Klin further argued that DSM-IV focuses
excessively on superﬁcial similarities between AS and HFA,
ignoring AS’s unique features: presence of social motivation with
awkward, one-sided social approaches, normal or precocious
languagewith pragmatic deﬁcits and one-sided verbosity, pretend
play of unusual content, and circumscribed interests with
inordinate gathering of information (Klin et al., 2005; Baron-
Cohen and Klin, 2006). Importantly (albeit inconsequently), Klin
proposed a reversal of the precedence rule: in the presence of
criteria for both HFA and AS, As should be diagnosed.
IS AS DIFFERENT FROM HFA?
Eventually, the controversy gradually converged onto knowing
if AS and HFA can be distinguished qualitatively (suggesting
diﬀerent etiological and neurobiological mechanisms for each
syndrome), or if they merely diﬀer quantitatively and should
therefore be regarded as variants of a single disorder (Macintosh
and Dissanayake, 2004). Most studies used cross-sectional
comparisons between subjects with either diagnosis to answer
this question. Clinical diﬀerences between AS and HFA
proved subtle at best. AS subjects have earlier language
development, more appropriate intonation and pitch, and
more pedantic speech and idiosyncratic vocabulary, while HFA
subjects show more echolalia, pronoun reversal, and neologisms
(Eisenmajer et al., 1998; Gilchrist et al., 2001; Macintosh and
Dissanayake, 2004). AS children also display more imitative
social play, attention and help-seeking, and reciprocal social
interactions than HFA children (Prior et al., 1998; Macintosh
and Dissanayake, 2006). Yet, these superior linguistic and social
skills of AS children do not translate into superior ability to make
friends or engage in reciprocal conversation. By adolescence,
diﬀerences are no longer obvious, although AS subjects still show
more sophisticated vocabulary and greater desire for friendship
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FIGURE 2 | Mandatory diagnostic criteria for Asperger Syndrome according to Szatmari et al. (1989), Gillberg (2002), ICD-10 and DSM-IV TR.
(Eisenmajer et al., 1998; Szatmari, 2000; Gilchrist et al., 2001;
Wing et al., 2011). Cognitively, and as a group, AS subjects
typically show a combination of superior verbal performance and
visual-spatial, perceptual, andmotor deﬁcits (non-verbal learning
disability proﬁle), while the opposite proﬁle characterizes HFA
(Gillberg, 2002; Chiang et al., 2014). However, individual
variability is huge, and it is diﬃcult to control for the biasing
eﬀects of a diﬀerential diagnosis based on diﬀerences in language
development (Klin et al., 2005). Studies that looked at theory of
mind performance found mainly quantitative diﬀerences, with
AS subjects scoring intermediately between HFA and healthy
controls (Prior et al., 1998; Macintosh and Dissanayake, 2004).
Although many authors consider clumsiness as typical of
AS, studies on motor control and gait have only found
subtle diﬀerences in comparisons with HFA (Macintosh and
Dissanayake, 2004; Rinehart et al., 2006). Again, diﬀerences
decrease with age (Iwanaga et al., 2000). Finally, AS subjects
show more intense preoccupations and circumscribed interests,
while individuals with HFA have poorer imaginative play and
more stereotyped behaviors, such as body rocking (Macintosh
and Dissanayake, 2004; South et al., 2005). In terms of global
functioning, AS subjects fare signiﬁcantly better academically,
but not in terms of employment or independent living (Tantam,
1994; Howlin, 2003).
An obvious approach to the question of whether or not
AS and HFA are distinct entities is to look for biological
diﬀerences between them. Despite the accumulated evidence on
neurophysiological abnormalities in autism spectrum disorders
(ASD) as a group, few data are available on possible diﬀerences
between AS and HFA, apart from subtle diﬀerences in
EEG connectivity patterns and left-hemisphere intra-cortical
inhibition (abnormally decreased in HFA but not in AS; Duﬀy
et al., 2013; Enticott et al., 2013; Luckhardt et al., 2014). Genetic
studies have likewise produced little support for a discrimination
between AS and HFA, although this must be tempered by
growing evidence of a common genetic susceptibility shared by
neurodevelopmental disorders in general, rather than a speciﬁc
genetic etiology for each disorder (Lichtenstein et al., 2010).
Structural MRI studies comparing AS andHFA have produced
contradictory results, with two recent meta-analyses and a
recent systematic review reaching three diﬀerent conclusions
(Via et al., 2011; Yu et al., 2011; Pina-Camacho et al., 2013).
The most consistent positive ﬁndings come from studies that
diﬀerentiated AS from HFA based on language acquisition
history: compared to AS and typical controls, HFA subjects
have lower gray matter and white matter volumes, increased
gyriﬁcation, and abnormal cortical folding in inferior frontal
areas (including the pars opercularis; Nordahl et al., 2007;
McAlonan et al., 2008, 2009; Jou et al., 2010); increased gray
matter in supramarginal, superior temporal and inferior parietal
gyri bilaterally (McAlonan et al., 2008; Jou et al., 2010; Toal
et al., 2010), and decreased volume of the cerebellar vermis
and posterolateral lobule (Scott et al., 2009; Hodge et al.,
2010). However, these qualitative neuroanatomical diﬀerences
are contradicted by studies that only found quantitative
diﬀerences, with AS intermediately positioned between HFA
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and typical subjects (Lotspeich et al., 2004; Haznedar et al., 2006).
On the whole, data on the distinctiveness betweenAS andHFA
remain diﬃcult to interpret. Many diﬀerences are quantitative
rather than qualitative, and are distinctly more pronounced
at younger ages, although the same might be said of many
diﬀerences that discriminate HFA from typically developing
subjects (Luckhardt et al., 2014). Moreover, research has been
systematically plagued by diﬃculties ensuring independence
between selection criteria and outcome measures (Macintosh and
Dissanayake, 2004). Diagnostic and assessment methodologies
vary wildly across studies, with the direction of ﬁndings
inﬂuenced by the inclusiveness of diagnostic criteria for AS,
notably by whether language acquisition delay was used as a
criterion for diagnosing HFA (Via et al., 2011). Importantly, most
studies are cross-sectional, missing potential diﬀerences between
developmental trajectories in AS and HFA (Pina-Camacho et al.,
2013). Indeed there is increasing evidence that AS and HFA
correspond to distinct developmental trajectories (McAlonan
et al., 2008; Lotspeich et al., 2004), with HFA marked by a
delay or failure in the transition from right to left hemisphere
dominance, occurring at around age 3 in typically developing
children (Szatmari, 2000; Rinehart et al., 2002). Ultimately, the
insuperable fragility of AS as a diagnostic entity resides in the
lack of a biological marker, and in a phenotype that many see as
insuﬃciently diﬀerent from that of other related disorders.
A FORETOLD RESURRECTION?
Notwithstanding some clinical and biological diﬀerences between
AS and HFA, the DSM-5 Neurodevelopmental Disorders
Workgroup ﬁnally decided that there is insuﬃcient evidence
to support a meaningful distinction between them (Happé,
2011). DSM-5 therefore merged AS into a unitary category of
autism spectrum disorders, characterized by a mandatory dyad of
impaired social interaction and communication, and restricted,
repetitive behaviors and interests (in contrast with the previously
prevailing symptomatic triad; American Psychiatric Association
[APA], 2013). All three symptoms of social interaction and
communication deﬁcits are required for a diagnosis. For the
behavior and interest restriction criterion a polythetic deﬁnition
was retained, albeit increasing the minimum of necessary
symptoms from one to two, from a total of four (McPartland et al.,
2012). Finally, a universal onset clause requires that symptoms be
present from early childhood. Again, this profoundly modiﬁed
deﬁnition of autism was met with criticism from the minute the
ﬁrst draft became known. Many patients and families, as well as
adepts of the neurodiversity movement, were shocked that such
an identity-deﬁning diagnosis as AS ceased to exist overnight.
Several specialists in the ﬁeld felt that the decision was precipitate,
that it ignored evidence supporting AS as a valid clinical and
biological entity, and that DSM-5 fails to acknowledge the unique
clinical features of those formerly diagnosed with AS (Wing et al.,
2011; Spillers et al., 2014). Moreover, there are concerns that the
new deﬁnition of ASD is too restrictive and will exclude many
patients with AS from access to specialized treatment (Frazier
et al., 2012; McPartland et al., 2012; Mayes et al., 2013). In fact,
ﬁeld trials showed that DSM-5 ASD has improved speciﬁcity at
the cost of excluding more cognitively able individuals, including
up to 75% of those previously diagnosed with AS (Frazier
et al., 2012; Huerta et al., 2012; McPartland et al., 2012; Mayes
et al., 2013). Concerns were further fueled by the inclusion of
a new diagnosis of Social Communication Disorder in DSM-5,
as this was felt by many to imply that higher functioning AS
subjects would now migrate from the autistic spectrum to this
new residual, consolation-prize category (Huerta et al., 2012).
Others feel that the term AS should have continued to be
mentioned in the manual as an admissible label for a particular
group of patients within ASD, oﬀering a clinical description of
the syndrome but no diagnostic criteria (Wing et al., 2011).
This would allow AS patients who regard the terms autism
as unacceptably stigmatizing to keep their former diagnostic
label. Indeed there is evidence that patients, families, education
professionals, and health professionals connote AS with positive
features and associate Autism with strange behavior, learning
disability and family dysfunction (Kite et al., 2013; Spillers et al.,
2014). Still others remain unreconciled with DSM-5 and hopeful
of the syndrome’s rebirth in future revisions of the manual (Tsai,
2013). Regardless of whether or not there will be a future for AS
as a valid and meaningful clinical construct, its short existence
had the undeniable merit of boosting the public’s fascination with
autism (Happé, 2011).
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